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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Speech or Debate Clause-Alleged Criminal Conduct of
Congressmen Not Within the Scope of Legislative
Immunity
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I of the United States Constitution provides that "for any
Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives]
shall not be questioned in any other place."' Although the necessity for
the existence of immunity for legislators 2 has not been questioned since
the 17th century, the scope of the privilege has never been authoritatively determined.' A literal reading of the speech or debate clause
suggests that legislative immunity is limited to oral statements by congressmen on the floor of either the House or Senate. The Supreme
Court, however, consistently has construed the provision broadly, to
embrace not only verbal expression but also those "things generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
business before it."4 Furthermore, the Court has afforded federal legislators immunity from executive or judicial inquiry into the motives for
particular legislative acts in the context of both criminal and civil actions. 5 Recently, however, in United States v. Brewster' and Gravel v.
I. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 6.
2. Judicial and executive officers are protected by a common-law privilege from liability for
acts in their official capacities. See, e.g., Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (a libel action against
Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization in which the executive officer was given absolute
immunity for libel contained in news release); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)
(action by attorney against judge for removal from practice); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th
Cir. 1955) (action under civil rights statutes against justice of the peace). These privileges are not
overcome by allegations of maliciousness as long as the official is acting in "matters commited by
law to his control or supervision." Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-74 (1959). The absolute
immunity from civil liability resulting from the statements of federal judicial and executive officials
does not insulate them from criminal liability. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1939) (defendant was the Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit); Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 867 (1931)
(defendant was Secretary of the Interior).
3. Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past,
Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutionsin the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 3-5
(1968).
4. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
5. See. e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
6. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
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United States7 the Court found that neither an indictment based in part
on legislative acts performed pursuant to a bribe nor an investigation
into a private publication of classified documents that were involved in
a Senate investigation constituted an inquiry into legislative acts or the
motivations for such acts. Consequently, the Court refused to grant
immunity. The two decisions may result in significant curtailment of the
protection afforded by the speech or debate clause and thus may jeopardize the independence necessary for Congress to fulfill its role as a
coordinate branch of government.'
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The doctrine of legislative immunity9 had its origin in Parliament's
struggle for supremacy over the King of England during the 16th and
17th centuries. 0 In 1512, Parliament had sought to protect its independence and to enlarge its sphere of influence through passage of the Privilege of Parliament Act," which annulled the prosecution of a member
for activities engaged in during the proceedings of Parliament. 2 Sec7. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
8. See 408 U.S. at 531-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. See generally T. MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT
(16th ed. 1957); C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (Ohio State
University Bulletin, Contributions in History & Political Science, No. 6, 1921); Yankwich, The
Immunity of CongressionalSpeech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960
(1951).
10. Writers have sought early precedents for the assertion of this right and many refer to
Haxey's Case, which took place in the time of Richard 11 (1396-1397). Haxey, a member of the
House of Commons, had displeased the king by offering a bill to reduce the excessive charge of
the royal household and was condemned in Parliament as a traitor. On the accession of Henry
IV, however, Haxey exhibited a petition to the King in Parliament to reverse that judgment, as
being "against the law and custom which had been before in Parliament ....
The judgment was
reversed and annulled by the King with the assent of the House of Lords. T. MAY, supra note 9,
at 48. The Crown, in particular, was greatly disturbed by the increasing assertions of greater
parliamentary power, especially Parliament's intrusions into the once sacrosanct and reserved
areas of royal succession and religion. Celia, supra note 3, at 3-5.
11. The special act stated, inter alia: "That all suits, accusements, condemnations, executions, fines, amerciaments, punishments, corrections, grants, charges, and impositions, put or had,
or hereafter to be put or had unto or upon the said Richard, and to every other of the person or
persons afore specified, that now be of this present parliament, or that of any parliament hereafter
shall be, for any bill, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters, concerning the
parliament to be communed and treated of, be utterly void and of none effect." Privilege of
Parliament Act, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8 (1512). See C. WI'TKE, supra note 9, at 25 n.16.
12. Richard Strode, a member of Commons, had authored and introduced legislation regulating certain abuses in the Cornwall tin industry that appeared to have been motivated by considerations of personal interest. He was brought to court and charged with violating a local ordinance
against the obstruction of tin mining. Strode was found guilty, fined heavily, and imprisoned. The
case, one of the earliest and most significant involving the doctrine of legislative privilege, was
brought to the attention of the House of Commons, which passed a special bill resulting in Strode's
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ondly, in 1541 Parliament for the first time included a provision for the
freedom of speech for members of Parliament in the petition of the
House of Commons to the King. 3 During the reign of Charles I, how-

ever, a royally dominated court denied immunity to members by declaring that the Privilege of Parliament Act was a private act. The court

then found several members of Parliament guilty of delivering libelous
and seditious speeches in the House. 4 Subsequently, however, the convictions were reversed by the House of Lords after both Houses of
Parliament formally resolved that the Act was a general law. The House

of Lords concluded that only Parliament could deal with words spoken
therein. 5 Legislative immunity thus began as a protection against executive interference with the conduct of individual legislators and later
expanded to become an absolute shield against outside interference with
the entire legislative process. 6 By the middle of the 17th century the

privilege of freedom of speech and debate for members of Parliament
had been firmly established and it was never again seriously questioned. 7
Legislative immunity was established early in America when a privilege similar to that granted to the members of Parliament was incorpo-

rated into the laws of the American colonies. 8 As a result, when the
release. T. MAY, supra note 9, at 49-50; C. WITTKE, supra note 9, at 25; see note II supra and
accompanying text.
13. Since the earliest part of the reign of Henry VIII, the practice had developed and become
generally accepted that the Speaker of the House of Commons would at the very outset of a new
legislative session present a petition to the King claiming and reasserting the ancient rights and
privileges of the House of Commons. Historical records indicate that in 1541 the privilege of
freedom of speech in Parliament was included for the first time in the Speaker's petition. C.
WITTKE, supra note 9, at 23.
14. Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr. 294 (1629).
15. Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr. 294, 391 (1668). For further discussion
of the significance of this case see T. MAY, supra note 9, at 51; C. WITrKE,supra note 9, at 29-30.
See also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
16. 78 HARv. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1965).
17. See C. WITrKE, supranote 9, at 30. Although the existence of the parliamentary privilege
of freedom of speech and debate was never again seriously questioned in England, its proper scope
and application was still at issue in numerous cases that followed. Two of the most important of
these cases, decided in the 19th century, were Ex parte Wason, L.R. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869), and
Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839). In Wason it was held that courts, in either
civil or criminal proceedings, were powerless to question the motives and intentions of members
of Parliament when they were speaking or debating in Parliament. In Stockdale, members of
Parliament were given immunity for "whatever [was] done within the halls of [the] assembly
.
..
Stockdale further held that the parliamentary immunity did not extend to the private
printer of the debates in order to protect him in a libel suit brought for words of a member;
however, this part of the decision was overturned subsequently by statute. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9 (1840).
18. Yankwich, supra note 9, at 965. Typical of the broad scope that the immunity took is
Article XXI of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Massachusetts of 1780: "The
freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either House of the Legislature, is so essential to
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United States declared its independence, a privilege of congressional
immunity for speech or debate was included in the Constitution and
nearly identical provisions were drafted thereafter into most state constitutions. 9 Federal and state courts have accorded these federal and

state legislative immunity provisions a broad interpretation. Legislative
immunity has been employed to shield legislators from civil actions
arising from voting,"° from activities in committee proceedings,"' from
court injunctions attempting to prevent official publication of legislative
documents,' 2 and from conduct in proceedings of local legislative bodies. 23 Similarly, the privilege has been held to bar a wide variety of civil
actions.

4

Despite the broad application of the privilege, however, the

the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action
or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." MASS. CONST. art. XXI (1780). The Articles
of Confederation of 1777, Article VIII of the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, Article
XXI of the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts of 1780, and Article XXX of the Constitution of New Hampshire of 1784, all predating the United States Constitution of 1789, gave explicit
recognition to the legislative privilege.
19. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11; TENN. CONST. art
II, § 13. In reference to the state governments, the right probably would be recognized even if
distinct constitutional or statutory authority were absent. I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION § 866 (5th ed. 1891).
20. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-05 (1881); Canfield v. Gresham, 82 Tex.
10, 17 S.W. 390 (1891) (action against 56 members of Texas House of Representatives and its
sergeant-at-arms).
21. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (Senator Eastland, as member of
investigation committee, held to be within the scope of "legislative activity" defined in Tenney);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241,250 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (remedy for unseemly conduct, if any, by committee of Congress
is for Congress, or for the people, not the judiciary); Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56
A.2d 611 (1948) (constitutional provision applicable to a meeting of a duly constituted judiciary
committee of the General Assembly).
22. See McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960) (privilege extended to include
the Congressional Record appendix); Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp.
729 (D.D.C. 1956) (court had no power to prevent publication of Senate Document by Public
Printer pursuant to congressional resolution, even if pamphlet falsely declared that certain religious
social organization was a communist front).
23. See Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328 P.2d 795 (1958) (city council members
immune from liability for passing illegal ordinance); McGaw v. Hamilton, 184 Pa. 108, 39 A. 4
(1898) (conditional privilege to borough council member for slanderous statement). The
Restatement of Torts states that proceedings before a legislative body other than Congress or a
state legislature are subject only to a qualified privilege in defamation actions. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 590, comment c (1938).
24. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (suit under a civil rights statute); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-05 (1880) (false imprisonment); Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930) (senator given absolute immunity in slander action
upon a showing that his words were uttered in the course of a speech in the Senate, even though
the words were in no way related to any business before the Senate); Allen v. Superior Court, 171
Cal. App. 2d 444, 340 P.2d 1030 (1959) (action for assault against chairman of interim committee
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courts have not formulated the precise parameters of legislative immunity. In Coffin v. Coffin, 25 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in dictum, stated that the speech or debate clause must be

construed to include voting and "every other act resulting from the
nature, and in the execution, of the office . . . without enquiring
whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or
irregular and against their rules. ' 2 In 1880, in Kilbuorn v. Thompson,2
the United States Supreme Court relied on Coffin28 to hold that the
purpose of the "speech or debate" privilege would be best effectuated

by a liberal judicial construction. 29 Over seventy years later, in Tenney
v. Brandhove, ° plaintiff, who was summoned as a witness before a state
legislative committee, brought suit for damages against the members of
the committee, charging that the defendants were conducting the hear-

ing to harass plaintiff and to deprive him of his freedom of speech in
violation of the Civil Rights Statutes.3' The Court explained that if a
member's conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity," it can not be made the basis of a civil or criminal judgment against
him. Furthermore, the Court held that courts may not properly question
the motive behind a legislator's act 32 and that "the claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. ' 3 3 Turning to the situation
at bar, the Court found that the committee had acted within the sphere
of legitimate legislative duties by examining the plaintiff, and that therefore the committee members could not be held liable for the legislative
activity.34 In both Kilbourn and Tenney, however, the Court warned
of legislature dismissed); Hancock v. Burns, 158 Cal. App. 2d 785, 323 P.2d 456 (1958) (action
for alleged interference with employment contract); Canfield v. Gresham, 82 Tex. 10, 17 S.W. 390
(1891) (unlawful arrest).
25. 4 Mass. I (1808).
26. Id. at 27.
27. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
28. The Court in Kilbourn found Coffin to be "the most authoritative case in this country
on the construction of the provision in regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies ....
Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 201-05. The case involved an action for false imprisonment against some congressmen and the sergeant-at-arms of the House of Representatives arising out of the arrest and
imprisonment of plaintiff for contempt of the House. The Court held that the action of the House
was illegal because Congress had exceeded its power to punish for contempt. The demurrer urged
by the congressmen was sustained, however, on the ground that the legislators came within the
immunity accorded by the privilege because they had done nothing more than vote for the contempt
motion. Id.
30. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
31. 42 U.S.C.
1983, 1985(3) (1970), cited in Tenney v. Brandhove as 8 U.S.C. §§ 43 &
47(3).
32. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
33. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
34. Id. at 376-79.
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that the decisions should not be interpreted as precluding the possibility

of imposing criminal responsibility for legislative acts that could pervert
the spirit of the privilege and betray a legislator's position of trust. 5
In 1966, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Johnson,36 addressed

for the first time the issue whether the constitutional privilege against
inquiry into congressional activities applies in criminal as well as civil
actions. Defendant was charged with violating the federal conflict-ofinterest statute 7 and with conspiring to defraud the United States38
because he allegedly had accepted a bribe in return for an agreement to
seek a dismissal of federal indictments that were pending against officers of several savings and loan companies. Part of the evidence relied
on to establish the conspiracy charge was a speech delivered by defendant on the floor of the House that was favorable to loan companies
generally. The Government questioned Johnson extensively at trial
about the contents, authorship, and reasons for delivery of the speech.

The Court held that the speech or debate clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation for a congressman's speech, notwithstanding
allegations of bribery, and therefore that the clause prevents use of the
speech to substantiate a criminal conspiracy charge." The Johnson
Court specifically declined to address the constitutional validity of executive and judicial inquiry into legislative acts or the motivation for
legislative acts in those instances in which Congress, through a narrowly
drawn statute passed in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate

the conduct of its own members, authorizes such inquiry by delegating
to the executive and judicial branches the right to try a member for
conduct otherwise protected by the speech or debate clause."
35. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 204-05 (1880). In Kilbourn the Court stated that "[i]f we could suppose the members of these
bodies so far to forget their high functions and the noble instrument under which they act as to
imitate the Long Parliament in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the nation . . . we are
not prepared to say that such an utter perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose would be
screened from punishment by the constitutional provision for freedom of debate." 103 U.S. at 204.
36. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
37. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 281, 62 Stat. 697, as amended, Act of May 24, 1949,
ch. 139, § 6, 63 Stat. 90.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
39. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). The Court did not question the
power of the United States to try Johnson on the conflict-of-interest counts, and it authorized a
new trial on the conspiracy count, provided all references to the speech were eliminated. On
remand, the district court dismissed the conspiracy count without objection from the Government.
Johnson was then found guilty on the remaining counts, and his conviction was affirmed. United
States v. Johnson, 419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
40. 383 U.S. at 185.
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III.

BREWSTER AND GRAVEL

In the recent case of United States v. Brewster,4 1 the Supreme
Court again was confronted with the problem of interpreting the speech
or debate clause in relation to a criminal charge against a member of

Congress. Former Senator Daniel Brewster had been indicted12 under
18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), (g),4 3 a narrowly drawn statute under the terms

of which members of Congress are held criminally responsible for the
solicitation and acceptance of bribes. The Supreme Court found that the

indictment, though it charged receipt of a bribe in exchange for the
performance of legislative acts, entailed "no inquiry into legislative acts
or motivation for legislative acts" and therefore was not within the
ambit of the speech or debate clause.4 The Court reasoned that one who
takes or agrees to take money in exchange for a mere promise to per-

form a legislative act is in violation of the statute and that the Government need not show that the alleged illegal bargain in fact was performed."5 The Court explained that during a bribery trial the trial court
would be inquiring into activities that are merely "casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs, but not a part of the legislative process
itself." Therefore the Court concluded that the prosecution of Senator
Brewster under the instant statute was not prohibited by the speech or
debate clause. 6
In Gravel v. United States4 7 the Supreme Court considered a chal41. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
42. Counts I, 3, 5, and 7 of the indictment charged Senator Brewster with receiving $19,000
'in return for being influenced in his performance of official acts in respect to his action, vote,
and decision on postage rate legislation, which might at any time be pending before him in his
official capacity [as a member of the Senate Post Office Committee].'" Count 9 charged Brewster
with receipt of another $5,000 for acts already performed by him with respect to his "'action, vote,
and decision'" on that legislation.
43. Section 201(c)(1) provides in part: "Whoever, being a public official or person selected
to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks,
accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity,
in return for: (I) being influenced in his performance of any official act . . . [shall be guilty of an
offense]." 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1970). Section 201(a) defines "public official" to include a
"Member of Congress" and defines "official act" in sweeping terms as "any decision or action on
any question . . . which may . . . be brought before any public official, in his official capacity, or
in his place of trust ....
" 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970). Section 201(g) provides in part: "Whoever,
being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise
than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks,
demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself
or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him . . . [shall be guilty of an
offense]." 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1970).
44. 408 U.S. at 525.
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 528-29. Justices Brennan, Douglas and White dissented in this 6-3 decision.
47. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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lenge to the validity of an investigation by a federal grand jury into the
possible criminal conduct of a United States Senator in connection with
the-release and publication of the classified "Pentagon Papers."4 During a meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Building and Grounds of
the Senate Public Works Committee, Senator Gravel read extensively
from a copy of the Pentagon Papers and then placed the entire study
on the public record. Subsequently, the press reported that the Senator
had arranged for private publication of the material. In its investigation
of possible criminal violations, the grand jury subpoenaed an aid to the
Senator, but Gravel moved to quash the subpoena, contending that
parts of the aide's testimony would violate the speech or debate clause.
Initially, the Supreme Court explained that under the constitutional
privilege of legislative immunity a member of Congress and his aide are
to be "treated as one."49 The Court then determined that when the
record of a subcommittee's hearings and its report are availble to Congress, but no publication is authorized, private publication by a Senator
is not essential to the deliberations of the House and is not even an
element of the overall legislative process. Inquiry into the plans for
private publication thus does not pose a threat to the integrity or independence of the Senate through exposure of its deliberations to executive influence. The Court therefore concluded that the immunity of the
speech or debate clause did not extend to testimony before the grand
jury by the Senator's aide about the arrangement between Gravel and
the private publisher or about the aide's own participation, if any, in the
alleged transaction, as long as legislative acts of the Senator were not
challenged. 50
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BREWSTER AND GRAVEL
A broad construction of the privilege of legislative immunity has
been advocated by courts and commentators, primarily for two policyoriented reasons. First, the privilege is a concomitant of separation of
powers principles. The courts in construing the doctrine of legislative
48. The document popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers" is entitled "History of the
United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy" and bore a Defense Security classification of "Top Secret-Sensitive." The possible crimes that were investigated by the grand jury
included the retention of public property or records with intent to convert, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970),
the gathering and transmitting of national defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1970), the concealment or removal of public records or documents, 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970), and conspiracy to
commit such offenses and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). 408 U.S. at 608.
49. 408 U.S. at 616. See also United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (Ist Cir. 1972).
50. 408 U.S. at 626, 627. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented in this 5-4
decision. Justice Stewart dissented in part.
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immunity and in defining its scope must reconcile control of aberrant
conduct by individual legislators or staff members with the appropriate
measure of respect that should be accorded a coordinate branch of the
government.51 Inquiry by the judiciary into the motives underlying legislative proceedings would manifest an uncertainty about the good faith,
competence, or integrity of the legislature that does not comport with

the coordinate and co-equal status of the three branches of government.52 Moreover, such inquiry contravenes the general rule that the

judiciary may not interfere with legislative discretion exercised within

the scope of the legislature's constitutional powers,53 and also tends to

impair the stability of statutory law because the good or bad intentions
of individual legislators could become a criterion for determining the
applicable scope of legislation. Therefore, to implement these separa-

tion of powers principles, the legislative process should be shielded from
debilitative motivational analysis by the judiciary.54 Secondly, the privilege of legislative immunity is intended to promote public good. 55 Although the privilege is of a personal nature, it is not intended to protect
legislators against prosecutions for their own individual advantage as
much as it is to support the rights of the people, by enabling their

representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
either civil or criminal prosecutions. Hence, the public benefit is not
necessarily furthered by a particular speech or legislative act, but is
promoted by the deliberations of a legislature that is uninhibited by fear
of executive or judicial harassment. 5
In light of these policy arguments and the Supreme Court's own
51. Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislatorsand Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366,
385-86 (1967).
52. The courts have recognized that a judicial inquiry into the motives of the legislators is
not permitted in numerous cases involving governmental power to perform certain functions. See,
e.g.. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,455 (1931) (power of the United States to construct dam);
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 210 (1921) (Government's power to create
banks and issue bonds); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810) (state's power to sell
and dispose of lands).
53. See, e.g., Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (prior restraint
must be imposed upon the defendant by Congress and not by the courts).
54. Note, The Bribed Congressman'sImmunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 340
(1965).
55. In Tenney v. Brandhove the Court explained that immunity, which protects legislators
"from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty", is designed not for the
legislators' "private indulgence but for the public good." 341 U.S. at 377.
56. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). The court in Coffin maintained that in applying
the privilege, no distinction should be drawn between criminal and civil cases because the fear of
criminal prosecution is as likely, if not more likely, to inhibit proper legislative functioning as the
fear of civil sanctions. Id. See also Field, The ConstitutionalPrivilegesof Legislators, 9 MINN. L.
REv. 442, 443-46 (1925).
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prior interpretations of the speech or debate clause, the rationale of the
Court in Brewster and Gravel is not persuasive. The Court in Brewster
maintained that it has never construed the clause to protect all conduct
relating to the legislative process, 7 despite the statement in Kilbourn
that the privilege of immunity embraced those acts done in Congress
"in relation to the business before it." 5 Moreover, the Brewster Court's
conclusion that the only reasonable reading of the clause "consistent
with its history and purpose" is that it will not prohibit inquiry into
activities that are "casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs" 59 introduces a new standard by which to gauge the scope of the
clause-a standard that limits the concept of "legislative acts" protected
by the clause and thus conflicts with the policy of liberal construction
that has been developed by the courts over the past century.60 Mr.
Justice White, who dissented in Brewster, asserted that prosecution of
a congressman for agreeing to accept money in exchange for a promise
to perform a legislative act constitutes an inherent implication of legislative conduct. The majority's distinction between promise and performance, according to Justice White, is clearly inconsistent with the protection of legislative independence that forms the core of the speech or
debate clause. 1 Mr. Justice Brennan, who also dissented, maintained
that Brewster was not only charged with conduct that was "related to
the legislative process," but with a crime the proof of which necessarily
questioned the very motives for his legislative acts."
In the Gravel case, the Court denied legislative immunity when
Senator Gravel, seeking a wider audience, attempted privately to publish classified documents that were being considered in an investigation
by his Senate Subcommittee. Consequently, Gravel was exposed to a
grand jury investigation and possible prosecution for the publication.63
One legislative function that is within the sphere of the class of things
"generally done" by members of Congress "in relation to the business
before it" is that of informing the public about matters affecting the
administration of government. 4 In Gravel, however, the Court adopted
57. 408 U.S. at 515.
58.
59.

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.168, 204 (1880).
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972).

60. See 408 U.S. at 531-32. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 408 U.S. at 561. (White, J., dissenting).
62. 408 U.S. at 531.
63. 408 U.S. at 649. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Watkins v. United States, 345 U.S. 178 (1957). In considering the "power of Congress
to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of Government," the Supreme Court has stated that since "the earliest times in its history, the Congress has
assiduously performed an 'informing function' of this nature." Id. at 200 n.33.
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a narrower view of this legislative function than would comport with full

public disclosure.65 Consequently, the Court may have restricted the
privilege of "speech or debate" to the extent that the effective perform-

ance of a legislative task that is vital to the workings of our democratic
system has been endangered or at least rendered more difficult. 6
Because the Brewster Court concluded that the Senator's conduct
was not a protected activity under the speech or debate clause, it did
not address the issue that was not resolved by the Johnson Court,
namely, whether Congress constitutionally may delegate to the execu-

tive and judicial branches, through a narrowly drawn statute, the power
to try a member for conduct that is admittedly protected by the speech
or debate clause.67 On the basis of the foregoing discussion, however,
the issue should have been confronted. The social value of criminal
penalties for certain conduct of legislators may well outweigh the public
interest in legislative freedom of speech and activity." In the case of an
alleged bribe of one or more legislators, the deterrent force of criminal
prosecution can best ensure a high standard of conduct by public officials. Moreover, for more than 100 years Congress has delegated to the
courts the responsibility for trying legislators accused of accepting
bribes." In other words, by virtue of its constitutional power to regulate
65. 408 U.S. at 661-62. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. The essence of our form of government was at the heart of Justice Black's reminder in
the "Pentagon Papers Case" that "the press was protected so that it could have the secrets of
government and inform the people." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717
(1971). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gravel, maintained that if in the course of the continuing
dialogue between elected representatives and the public, information is revealed that is embarrassing to other branches of government or violates their determinations of necessary secrecy, the right
to inform and be informed should take precedence. 408 U.S. at 661-62.
67. 408 U.S. at 529 n.18.
68. Note, supra note 54, at 340-41. See also C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 4-5 (rev. ed. 1970).
69. A statute passed in 1853 declared a member "liable to indictment as for high crime and
misdemeanor in any court of the United States," for accepting compensation intended to influence
a "vote or decision on any question brought before him in his official capacity." Act of Feb. 26,
1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171. Congress, sparked by the procurement frauds of the Civil War,
enacted 2 other statutes that dealt with the bribery of members. An 1862 statute, Act of July 16,
1862, ch. 180, 12 Stat. 577, which remained substantially unchanged until 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 205
(1958) [now 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970)], also delegated to the courts the power to punish congressmen. Senator Roscoe Conkling commented in floor discussion that the measure was intended to
penalize legislators who received "pay for votes or influence in any matter pending before Congress." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (1862). An 1864 conflict of interest statute barred
congressmen from receiving compensation for their services before any agency. Act of June 1I,
1864, ch. 119, 13 Stat. 123 [now 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)]. In the 1962 revision of the conflict of
interest statutes, Congress broadened and reaffirmed this delegation of authority to the courts. 18
U.S.C. 0 201-18 (1970). For the text of §§ 201(a), (c)(l), (g) see note 43 supra.
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the conduct of its members," Congress has dictated that judicial abstention from inquiry into the functioning of the legislature, pursuant to
separation of powers principles, does not justify similar respect for the
motives of individual legislators in bribery cases. If in delegating this
jurisdiction to the courts, however, Congress fails to define the offense
with requisite specificity, application of the privilege of immunity seems
warranted. 71 Sections 201(c)(1) and 201 (g) of the present statute authorize conviction for an agreement to receive compensation without proof
that the bribed service has been performed or even that consideration
has passed. 72 The statute thus permits the jury to convict on the basis
of evidence of intent alone. Because of the uncertainty that pervades
standards of proof for intent and the discretion in defining the offense
afforded to prosecutors by a vague statute, a congressman might reasonably fear that honest conduct could be misinterpreted or that he might
be subject to politically motivated prosecution. 73 Furthermore, the majority opinion in Brewster indicates that the judiciary will allow inquiry
into legislative motivation whenever bribery is alleged by the executive.74
The indispensability of campaign funds and the "favors" requested by
constituents may combine to blur the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate action. 75 Because it lacks a precise definition of bribery, the
statute grants to the executive more investigatory power over legislative
acts and motives than is necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose
and consequently may have a "chilling" effect on the work of the legislature.7 Therefore, except as otherwise provided by Congress in a precisely drawn statute, the legislature's deliberations should be insulated
from the purview of the courts and influence by the executive in order
77
to preserve for the public the benefits of open legislative functioning.
70. Article I, § 5 of the United States Constitution provides that "[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and with the
Concurrence of two thirds expel a Member."
71. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrinein the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
67 (1960). "Vaugeness is not an extraneous ploy or judicial deus ex machina but rather has very
intimate connections both with the substance of individual freedom from arbitrary and discriminatory governmental action and with the federal institutional processes established to protect that
freedom." Id. at 88.
72. For the text of §§201(c)(1) and 201(g) see note 43 supra.
73. See Note, supra note 71, at 88.
74. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 531 (1972).
75. The problem has not escaped congressional concern. See Hearings Before the Special
Comm. to Investigate PoliticalActivities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 980-82 (1956-57).
76. Note, supra note 54, at 347.
77. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
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CONCLUSION

The institution of criminal charges against critical or disfavored
legislators by the King of England was the prime factor prompting the
long struggle for parliamentary privilege and, in the context of the
American system of separation of powers, is the predominant thrust of
the speech or debate clause.78 If the privilege of legislative immunity is
to perform its traditional function of permitting legislators to carry out
their legislative functions without fear of prosecution or harrassment
from the executive and judicial branches, it should be applied broadly
to effectuate its intended purpose of preserving the independence of the
legislature and public good that such independence fosters.7 9 To hold,
however, that the privilege of legislative immunity is a bar to a legislator's criminal prosecution in a given case does not mean necessarily that
he will not be punished for his transgressions, because Congress has the
power to reprimand or expel misbehaving members." The power to
punish members is broad in scope, extending to all cases in which the
offense is, in the judgment of the House or Senate, inconsistent with the
trust and duty of a member.8 ' Congressional discipline for misconduct,
however, has been rare and, as a practical matter, cannot be relied upon
with certainty to vindicate those injured by congressional malfeasance. 2
Nevertheless, safeguards for the public against improper use of the
privilege accorded legislators are placed by the Constitution in the hands
of the electorate, because the electorate can refuse to return a dishonest
legislator to office. The combination of the congressional corrective and
the possibility of public disgrace should deter legislators from criminal
3*
conduct as effectively as criminal penaltiess

78. Id. at 182.
79. Id. at 180-81.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
81. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897) (Senate investigation of charges that Senate
members had speculated in stocks of companies interested in a pending tariff bill).
82. See generally Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REv. I (1914).
83. See 78 HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1475 (1965).
* On November 18, 1972, a Federal District Court jury of the District of Columbia convicted
Brewster on 3 counts of the 10-count indictment which could bring a total of 6 years in prison and
$30,000 in fines. Attorney's for Brewster announced that they would file motions for a new trial,
and if necessary, for an appeal. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 1, col. I.

